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INTRODUCrION
Since 1970, federal prosecutors have increasingly relied on
civil and criminal forfeiture as tools for law enforcement.' Statutes
now provide for forfeiture to the government of assets connected
to crimes such as money laundering,2 drug trafficking,3 racketeer-
ing,4 and mail and wire fraud,5 among others. The goal of these
statutes is to eliminate profit as an incentive for crime.6
Under 18 U.S.C. § 981, money involved in money laundering
is an asset subject to forfeiture.7 Because money is fungible, pros-
ecutors have special problems when money subject to forfeiture
("dirty" money) is mixed with money not connected to illegal
activity ("clean" money).' Rather than try to sort the dirty money
from the clean, some federal prosecutors have tried to seize and
forfeit9 all of the money, based on a facilitation theory." Under
1. In 1970, criminal forfeiture was revived by the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations statute (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), and the
Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
See infra text accompanying notes 37-43. For examples of application of these and other
forfeiture statutes, see David A. Kaplan et al., Where the Innocent Lose, NEWSWEEK, Jan.
4, 1993, at 42.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
3. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)-(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(D)(v)-(vi) (Supp. IV 1992).
6. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374 (explaining reasons for bill expanding reach of existing forfeiture
laws).
7. See United States v. $448,342.85, 969 F.2d 474, 476 (7th Cir. 1992).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1158-62 (2d
Cir. 1988) (discussing pooling of "traceable proceeds" from drug transactions with other
funds).
9. Seizure and forfeiture are distinct events. Seizure occurs when the government
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this theory, the clean money facilitates the laundering of the dirty
money by hiding it; in doing so, the clean money becomes in-
volved in money laundering. Thus, the clean money is itself taint-
ed and subject to forfeiture."
This Note examines the broad facilitation theory advanced by
some federal prosecutors and concludes that the theory gives pros-
ecutors undesirable power to seize property. It argues that a nar-
rower theory, conditioning forfeiture on the intent of the holder of
the money, still would accomplish the goals of forfeiture, and that
this theory is preferable because it would protect innocent persons
from seizure and forfeiture and reduce the possibility of excessive
forfeitures. The Note concludes that the intent-based standard
would not impede efforts to deter crimes through forfeiture of
assets used in their commission. The forfeiture laws provide ample
means to seize assets of wrongdoers. Moreover, under this stan-
dard, the facts of many prior cases would produce the same re-
sults as under the facilitation theory, while innocent persons would
be spared the cost and risk of defending their property.
Part I of this Note surveys the common law and statutory ori-
gins of forfeiture in the United States, emphasizing the growth of
forfeiture in American law from a tool used to enforce the cus-
toms laws to the key weapon against the drug trade. Part II de-
scribes the facilitation theory and reviews the cases in which pros-
ecutors tried to apply the theory. Part III argues that although a
facilitation theory that disregards intent may result from a plausi-
ble construction of the federal forfeiture statute,12 it is bad policy
and conceptually infirm. Finally, the Note concludes that instead
of applying the broad facilitation theory, courts ought to use an
analysis based on the intent of the possessor of the money to
determine forfeitability.
takes possession of an asset. BLAcK's LAW DICIONARY 1359 (6th ed. 1990). Forfeiture
occurs when the owner is divested of his interest in the property. Id. at 650.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Accounts, 795 F. Supp. 391, 392-97 (S.D. Fla.
1992).
11. Id. at 396-97.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FORFEITURE
IN THE UNITED STATES
Although both civil and criminal forfeiture have long histories
in the common law, they had very limited use in the United States
until 1970. Since then, statutes providing for criminal and civil
forfeiture have proliferated. However, modem forfeiture law is still
heavily influenced by past practices. For purposes of this Note, the
most important artifact from the past is that even though forfei-
ture is intended partly to be punishment for crimes, property
owners receive little of the procedural protection given to criminal
defendants.
A. The History of Forfeiture
By the time the U.S. Constitution was adopted, three kinds of
forfeiture had been established under English law.13 The first re-
quired forfeiture of "inanimate object[s] directly or indirectly caus-
ing the accidental death of a King's subject."' 4 The object, called
a deodand, was considered the guilty party, so the proceeding was
in rem against the object, and the owner's innocence was not a
defense."5 At first, the value of the object was used toward mass-
es said for the good of the dead man's soul, or other charitable
purposes, but the institution later became a source of revenue to
the Crown, justified as a penalty for the owner's carelessness.1 6
The second kind of forfeiture was known as forfeiture of estate.
On conviction for treason or felony, all real and personal property
of a traitor or felon was forfeit. The ground was that breach of
the King's law merited denial of the right to own property." The
third kind of forfeiture was statutory and applied to objects used
in violation of the customs or revenue laws. 9 For instance, the
13. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-82 (1974)
(surveying history of forfeiture at common law).
14. Id. at 680-81; OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 23-24 (The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1963) (1881).
15. HOLMES, supra note 14, at 23-24.
16. Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands,
Forfeitures, Wrongful Death, and the Western Nation of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169,
182-83 (1973).
17. EDWARD JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 41-42 (6th ed. 1949).
18. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *289.
19. Id.; see 3 id. at *261-62. In Calero-Toledo, the Court surmised that statutory
forfeiture was "a product of the confluence and merger of the deodand tradition and the
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Navigation Acts of 1660 required goods to be shipped in English
ships; violation resulted in forfeiture of both the goods and the
ship.2" The action was in rem against the object, and the owner
had to file a claim to contest the forfeiture.2' Moreover, an "act
of an individual seaman, undertaken without the knowledge of the
master or owner, could result in forfeiture of the entire ship. '
This harsh result was justified as a penalty on the ship's owner for
negligently choosing his crew.'
Of these varieties of forfeiture, only the last, statutory forfei-
ture, took root in the United States.24 Deodand never became a
part of American law.' Forfeiture of estate for treason was con-
stitutionally proscribed except during the traitor's natural life,26
and the First Congress abolished forfeiture of estate as punishment
for felons.27 Statutory forfeiture, on the other hand, flourished
both before and after the adoption of the Constitution; the type of
property subject to forfeiture grew from that used in violation of
customs and revenue laws to "ships and cargoes involved in cus-
toms offenses," eventually reaching "virtually any type of property
that might be used in the conduct of a criminal enterprise."2
Just as in England, statutory forfeiture in the United States
applied in rem to the property involved.29 The property was con-
belief that the right to own property could be denied the wrongdoer." Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974).
20. LAWRENCE A. HARPER, THE ENGLISH NAVIGATION LAWS: A SEVENTEENTH-
CENTURY EXPERIMENT IN SOCIAL ENGINEERING 111 (1939).
21. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *261-62.
22. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2807 (1993).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974). The
Court cited Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate, 188 S.W. 54, 55 (Tenn. 1916), in which the Su-
preme Court of Tennessee described the doctrine as based on "superstition."
26. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2. In England, a consequence of treason was a
permanent bar against the traitor's heirs' inheriting anything from the traitor. Due to the
hardship this worked on the traitor's children, the Framers of the U.S. Constitution pro-
scribed forfeiture except during the traitor's life. See Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U.S.
202, 210 (1875).
27. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 24, 1 Stat. 112, 117.
28. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683.
29. See, e.g., Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 401 (1877) (observing
that guilt attached to distillery without regard to owner's culpability beyond that implicit
in decision to lease property to a wrongdoer). But cf. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct.
2801, 2809 (1993) (saying that the Court has never approved of a forfeiture in which the
owner was entirely blameless).
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sidered the wrongdoer, regardless of the culpability of the own-
er.3" By placing his property in the hands of another, the owner
ran the risk that forfeiture would attach to the object as a conse-
quence of that person's "unlawful or wanton misconduct" that
involved the object in a crime."
B. Modern Forfeiture Law in the United States
Although forfeiture32 is still used in enforcement of the cus-
toms and revenue laws, 3 its main use today is as a tool against
crime, particularly the illegal drug trade.' For example, several
statutes now provide that on conviction for certain crimes, all
assets involved in the crime are forfeit to the United States. 35
Further, prosecutors may now use civil forfeiture as a powerful
weapon against drug trafficking and money laundering.36
The first major expansion of the use of forfeiture came in
1970, when Congress revived criminal forfeiture by enacting the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970."7 Title IX of this Act add-
ed chapter 96, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO)," to title 18 of the U.S. Code. Section 1963 of that title
provides that on conviction of a substantive violation of RICO, a
person is subject to penalties including forfeiture of assets acquired
or maintained in violation of the statute and all interest in enter-
prises participating in the substantive violation.39 The stated pur-
30. See Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 401.
31. Id.
32. In this Section, unless otherwise indicated, "forfeiture" means civil or criminal
forfeiture under any federal statute.
33. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1703 (1988) (providing for forfeiture of ships intended for
use in violation of customs or revenue laws).
34. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 427, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1990) (calling asset forfei-
ture "one of the most important tools of law enforcement in the war on drugs"); see also
United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1145 (1993) (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing) (describing forfeiture as "the centerpiece of the Nation's drug enforcement laws").
35. See infra text accompanying notes 37-43.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 50-66. Civil forfeiture is different from crimi-
nal forfeiture in two key respects. First, conviction is not a prerequisite for civil forfei-
ture. Second, the protections given accused persons in criminal proceedings do not apply.
See infra text accompanying notes 68-74.
37. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.).
38. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1)-(2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Modem criminal forfeiture
differs from its older form in that persons are not necessarily deprived of all property on
conviction. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
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pose of the provision was to weaken the influence of organized
crime over legitimate business by returning enterprises to honest
use as quickly as possible.40
Congress has since expanded the applicability of criminal
forfeiture. RICO now provides for forfeiture of the proceeds of
racketeering and reaches tainted assets even in the hands of oth-
ers, except for bona fide purchasers for value.4' Other provisions
for criminal forfeiture include the Continuing Criminal Enterprise
statute (also known as the "Drug Kingpin statute")42 and the
criminal money laundering statute.43
Revival of criminal forfeiture has been accompanied by ex-
pansion of the scope of civil forfeiture. As previously discussed,
civil forfeiture originally applied to property involved in violations
of the customs or revenue laws.' Now, civil forfeiture is used to
make crime less attractive by depriving criminals of the profits of
crime. 45 Moreover, civil forfeiture offers prosecutors many proce-
dural advantages over criminal forfeiture.' Most notably, a per-
son may suffer civil forfeiture even though no one has been or
will be convicted of or even charged with a crime. To seize an
asset, the government needs only to show probable cause to be-
40. 116 CONG. REc. 6709-10 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Poff).
41. Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 3, sec. 302,
§ 1963(a), (c), 98 Stat. 1837, 2040 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), (c) (1988
& Supp. IV 1992)).
42. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988). This provision was enacted a few months after the enact-
ment of RICO as part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 408, 84 Stat. 1236, 1265-66 (codified in scattered sections of
21 U.S.C.).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 982 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
44. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23.
45. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3374.
46. But see id. at 3379 (observing that despite civil forfeiture's relative advantages,
the need to pursue civil actions duplicating criminal prosecution burdens prosecutors). A
recent case from the Ninth Circuit has made the Double Jeopardy Clause another impor-
tant consideration for prosecutors. In United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d
1210 (9th Cir. 1994), the court held that an action for civil forfeiture, when separate
from a criminal prosecution, violated the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against putting a
person in double jeopardy for the same crime. Id. at 1214. However, this decision con-
flicts with the holdings of two other circuits. See United States v. 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13
F.3d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994). Although prosecutors will now need to bring civil for-
feiture actions as part of criminal prosecutions in some cases, the decision has no effect
on civil forfeiture actions when prosecutors have no intention of ever charging the prop-
erty owner with the criminal offense that is the basis for the forfeiture action.
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lieve that the asset bears the requisite relation to illegal activity. 7
Once this is done, the property will be forfeit unless the owner,
by a preponderance of the evidence, either shows that the connec-
tion does not exist or establishes a defense.' Further, in a civil
forfeiture proceeding, the burden of proof is on the owner to
show innocence.49
Forfeiture is particularly important to the enforcement of drug
laws." Section 881 of title 21 of the U.S. Code provides for civil
forfeiture in drug cases. 1  As originally enacted, 2 section 881
was a traditional provision for statutory forfeiture. All contraband
was forfeit to the United States, as was all real and personal prop-
erty used or intended for use in the illegal use, production, dis-
tribution, import, or export of drugs. 3
In 1978, Congress substantially expanded the scope of possible
forfeitures; in addition to the property described above, property
used to "facilitate" the drug trade became subject to forfeiture. 4
The breadth of this term meant that prosecutors could seek forfei-
ture of assets related only indirectly to the drug trade.5' The gov-
ernment could now also cause forfeiture of the proceeds of drug
dealing. Later, the scope of section 881 was further expanded to
include real property "used, or intended to be used[,] . . . to com-
mit, or to facilitate" certain violations of federal drug laws. 6
These changes also gave innocent owners the important new
protection of an affirmative defense. As a result, no legal or equi-
47. E.g., Nnadi v. Richter, 976 F.2d 682, 686 (11th Cir. 1992).
48. See infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
49. Id.
50. See supra note 34.
51. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) provides for forfeiture of all illegal
drugs, any vehicle used in the transportation, manufacture, or sale of drugs, any money
or securities used in a drug offense, and any real property involved in a drug offense.
52. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-513, tit. II, § 511, 84 Stat. 1236, 1276 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993)).
53. Id. § 511(a) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
54. Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, 92 Stat. 3768 (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988)).
55. See infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text; see also United States v. 92
Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1133 (1993) (plurality opinion) (calling the amend-
ment "an important expansion of government power").
56. Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. III,
§ 306(a), 98 Stat. 2040, 2050 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988)).
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table interest in property is subject to civil forfeiture under section
881 if the owner establishes that he neither
knew [nor] consented to the fact that:
1. the property was furnished or intended to be furnished in
exchange for a controlled substance in violation of law,
2. the property was proceeds traceable to such an illegal ex-
change, or
3. the property was used or intended to be used to facilitate
any violation of Federal illicit drug law8.s7
Although the Constitution probably requires some protection for
innocent owners,5 8 it probably does not require as much as this
statute provides.59  Nonetheless, the innocent owner defense is
now incorporated into most federal forfeiture statutes.6°
Another way to attack drug dealing and other crimes is to
pursue directly the money these crimes generate. The drug trade
generates huge amounts of currency that cannot easily be put into
the stream of commerce.61 Recognizing that transactions involving
large amounts of currency may be cause for suspicion,62 Congress
57. 124 CONG. REc. 34,672 (1978) (joint explanatory statement of Title III of the
Psychotropic Substances Act). Although the natural reading of this statement indicates
that knowledge or consent is an element to be proved by the government, the statute
gives the owners of property the burden of proving lack of knowledge, lack of consent,
or lack of willful blindness by a preponderance of the evidence. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1988
& Supp. V 1993).
58. See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2809 (1993) ("In [no forfeiture
case] did the Court apply the guilty-property fiction to justify forfeiture when the owner
had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the unlawful use of his prop-
erty."); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 688-89 (1974) (sug-
gesting that forfeiture of truly innocent owner's property could "give rise to serious con-
stitutional questions").
59. See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2809-10 (observing that the Court has rejected lack of
knowledge or lack of consent to illegal use as common law defenses to forfeiture); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1988) (protecting transferee from forfeiture only when transfer-
ee establishes that he is a bona fide purchaser for value).
60. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2) (1988) ("No property shall be forfeited under this
section to the extent of the interest of an owner or lienholder by reason of any act or
omission established by that owner or lienholder to have been committed without the
knowledge of that owner or lienholder.").
61. "The importance of converting cash into a manageable physical form is illustrated
by the case of Anthony Castelbuono. Castelbuono somewhat conspicuously brought
$1,187,450 in small bills to a casino. The cash had an estimated volume of 5.75 cubic
feet and weighed 280 pounds." Sarah N. Welling, Smurfs, Money Laundering, and the
Federal Criminal Law: The Crime of Structuring Transactions, 41 FLA. L. REV. 287, 291
(1989).
62. See H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1970), reprinted in 1970
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has required banks to report to the U.S. Treasury cash transac-
tions involving more than $10,000.63 To spend their gains without
drawing attention to their activities, criminals must make the mon-
ey appear to have had a legitimate source; doing so is called
"laundering" the money.64 Since 1986, money laundering itself has
been a crime.' Violators are subject to criminal fines, imprison-
ment, and criminal and civil forfeiture.6
Because profit is the motive for many crimes, the money laun-
dering statutes described above try to fight crime by making it
harder for criminals to use the proceeds of their crimes. Provisions
for civil and criminal forfeiture take a more direct approach and
simply take property away from persons involved in crimes. By
striking directly at the motive, civil forfeiture is a powerful weapon
against crime, and the minimal protection for property owners in
civil forfeiture cases greatly amplifies this power.
Civil forfeiture cases under any of these statutes follow a
common pattern: the government will seize an asset, and then the
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4394, 4396-97.
63. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(1) (1994). 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (1988) requires banks to
report transactions under circumstances to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury.
Under the current regulations, banks must report all transactions involving over $10,000
in currency. Multiple transactions made in the same day are to be consolidated if the
bank knows they are made on behalf of the same person. Because of attempts to evade
this requirement, Congress subsequently enacted 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1988), making it a
crime to cause a bank to fail to file a currency transaction report (CTR) or to structure
a transaction to evade the reporting requirement. Sections 5313 and 5324 are often called
the CTR statutes.
64. See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas, 847 F.2d 1417, 1419 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989).
65. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (1988). Section 1956(a)(1) prohibits certain transac-
tions involving "proceeds of specified unlawful activity" when the transaction is intended
to promote the crime or to hide the source of the money. Section 1957(a) makes it a
crime knowingly to "engage[] or attempt[] to engage in a monetary transaction in crimi-
nally derived property that is of a value greater than $10,000 and is derived from speci-
fied unlawful activity." Section 1957(0(2) defines "criminally derived property" as "any
property constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained from a criminal offense." "Spec-
ified unlawful activity" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) as including mail and wire
fraud, kidnapping, gambling, bribery, and drug crimes, among others.
66. Civil forfeiture of assets involved in violations of the money laundering statutes is
provided for in 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Section 981(a)(1)(A) sub-
jects to forfeiture "[a]ny property, real or personal, involved in a transaction or attempt-
ed transaction in violation of [the money laundering or CTR statutes], or any property
traceable to such property." Other parts of § 981(a)(1) subject many other assets to for-
feiture, including the proceeds of foreign drug crimes, § 981(a)(1)(B), and of mail and
wire fraud, § 981(a)(1)(D)(v)-(vi). Subsection 981(a)(2) creates an affirmative defense for
innocent owners. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
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owner will try to prevent forfeiture.67 The government may seize
an asset when it has probable cause to believe that the asset is
subject to forfeiture.68 Although the government must have prob-
able cause before seizure, it usually does not have to show proba-
ble cause until afterwards.69 Following seizure, any person claim-
ing an interest in the property is entitled to a hearing at which the
government must show that it had probable cause to seize the
asset; if the government fails to show this, the seizure is invalid
and the property must be returned to its owner.7'
67. See, e.g., United States v. All Funds Presently on Deposit, 832 F. Supp. 542
(E.D.N.Y. 1993).
68. In this context, "probable cause" means "reasonable ground for belief . . . sup-
ported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion." United States v.
Four Million, Two Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand, 762 F.2d 895, 903 (11th Cir. 1985) (cita-
tion omitted), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986). The statutes all state that to be subject
to forfeiture, an asset must bear some connection to crime. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (subjecting to forfeiture all property "involved
in" a violation of specified statutes). This Note addresses, in large part, the degree of
connection required before property is subject to forfeiture, but logic dictates that there
can be no probable cause to believe that property bears any relation to a statutory viola-
tion unless there is also probable cause to believe that the statute has been violated in
the first place.
69. To commence in rem forfeiture proceedings, the government has several options.
First, it can follow the procedure set forth in the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admi-
ralty and Maritime Claims [hereinafter Supplemental Rules] and file a complaint with the
clerk of the court having jurisdiction over the property. 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(2) (Supp. IV
1992); 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1988). Under Supplemental Rule C(3), the clerk must then
issue a summons and warrant for the arrest of the property. Second, the property may
be seized incident to a lawful arrest or search, or pursuant to a seizure warrant. 18
U.S.C. § 981(b)(2); 21 U.S.C. § 881(b). Although the proceeding for a seizure warrant is
ex parte, issuance requires a finding of probable cause by a federal magistrate. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 41(c). Third, under 21 U.S.C. § 881(b)(4), the Attorney General may seize
assets when there is probable cause to believe that they are subject to civil forfeiture un-
der the drug laws.
None of these procedures gives owners a hearing before their property is seized.
Although the Supreme Court recently held that the lack of a hearing before seizure of
real property generally violates the right to due process, United States v. James Daniel
Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 505 (1993), this principle probably does not extend
to seizures of money. In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679
(1974), the Court upheld seizure of a yacht prior to a hearing, reasoning that the proper-
ty could easily be "removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed, or concealed, if advance
warning of confiscation were given." Under this rationale, the government should be able
to seize money before giving the owner a hearing because of the extreme ease and
speed with which money moves by wire transfer and other means: See United States v.
Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 49 (2d Cir. 1993) (rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge to war-
rantless seizure of bank account after finding that mobility of funds constitutes "exigent
circumstances"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1294 (1994).
70. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. United States, 11 F.3d 1119, 1124-25 (2d Cir.
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Once the government seizes property and demonstrates proba-
ble cause for the seizure, the owner will forfeit the property with-
out any further showing by the government unless he proves that
the property is not subject to forfeiture.71 In contrast to the
government's light burden of showing only probable cause to justi-
fy seizure, the claimant challenging forfeiture must make his show-
ing by a preponderance of the evidence.' The claimant also
bears this same heavy burden under the innocent owner de-
fense.73 Furthermore, although the government may use hearsay
to establish probable cause, hearsay is inadmissible to show that
property is not subject to forfeiture or to establish (or rebut) the
innocent owner defense.74
1993); see 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1988) (requiring that the government show probable cause
before instituting forfeiture action). The procedures for civil forfeiture under the money
laundering and drug statutes are generally those used for forfeiture under the customs
laws. 18 U.S.C. § 981(d) (Supp. IV 1992); 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1988). Under Supplemen-
tal Rule E(4)(f), any person claiming an interest in seized property is entitled to a
prompt hearing at which the government must show probable cause for the seizure.
Moreover, a complaint under these rules must "state the circumstances from which the
claim arises with such particularity that the . . . claimant will be able, without moving for
a more definite statement, to commence an investigation of the facts and to frame a
responsive pleading." Supplemental Rule E(2)(a). In United States v. $39,000 in Canadian
Currency, 801 F.2d 1210, 1218-19 (10th Cir. 1986), the court held that the "drastic na-
ture" of forfeiture required increased protection for claimants, and accordingly that ordi-
nary notice pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was inadequate under
Supplemental Rule E(2)(a). Accord United States v. $38,000 in U.S. Currency, 816 F.2d
1538, 1548 (11th Cir. 1986).
71. 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1988). This section is in the title of the U.S. Code that deals
with customs laws. Because modern civil forfeiture grew out of the forfeiture provisions
used to enforce the customs laws, see supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text, civil
forfeiture statutes often specify the procedures in the customs statutes. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(d); 21 U.S.C. § 881(d).
72. Daccarett, 6 F.3d at 57. This burden-shifting has survived constitutional challenge.
See United States v. 228 Acres of Land and Dwelling, 916 F.2d 808, 814 (2d Cir. 1990)
(forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1091 (1991); United
States v. One 1970 Pontiac GTO, 529 F.2d 65, 66 (9th Cir. 1976) (forfeiture under 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1988)).
73. See, e.g., United States v. 1988 Oldsmobile Cutlass Supreme, 983 F.2d 670, 674
(5th Cir. 1993) (civil forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. IV. 1992));
United States v. Real Property Located at Section 18, 976 F.2d 515, 520 (9th Cir. 1992)
(forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988)).
74. United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618, 621-22 (3d Cir. 1989); United
States v. All Monies ($477,048.62) in Account No. 90-3617-3, 754 F. Supp. 1467, 1471
(D. Haw. 1991).
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II. SECTION 981 AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE FACILITATION THEORY
The facilitation theory arose as a justification under the mon-
ey laundering forfeiture statute 5 for seizing untainted funds that
had been mixed with forfeitable proceeds of money laundering.
This Part explains the facilitation theory and reviews the seminal
cases in its development. It then surveys subsequent cases to gauge
the influence of the theory.
A. The Development of the Facilitation Theory
The facilitation theory seems simple. Under 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(1)(A), property "involved in" money laundering transac-
tions is subject to forfeiture. Property that facilitates money laun-
dering is considered to be "involved in" money laundering. Under
a broad definition of facilitation, untainted money that mixes with
the proceeds of crime facilitates money laundering by making the
tainted money look innocent. Thus, by facilitating money launder-
ing, the untainted money becomes involved in money laundering
and is subject to forfeiture.
The first case to apply this theory was United States v. All
Monies ($477,048.62) in Account No. 90-3617-3.76 This case was
one of several stemming from the criminal investigation of a Peru-
vian money laundering and drug organization. The claimant was
the owner of a Peruvian money exchange, or cambio," whose
bank accounts in New York were seized as subject to forfeiture
75. 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Although referred to in this Note as
"the money laundering forfeiture statute," § 981 subjects to forfeiture property that is
involved in numerous different crimes, many of which are unrelated to money laundering.
See supra note 66.
76. 754 F. Supp. 1467 (D. Haw. 1991).
77. A cambio is a kind of money exchange house in Latin America. Cambios oper-
ate independently of governmental foreign exchange, trading dollars for local currency
and vice versa. They also maintain accounts in dollars in the United States for clients
who, for reasons varying from concern over personal safety to tax evasion, do not want
to keep assets in domestic banks. See generally Alan S. Fine, Of Forfeiture, Facilitation
and Foreign Innocent Owners: Is a Bank Account Containing Parallel Market Funds Fair
Game?, 16 NOVA L. REv. 1125, 1131-32 (1992) (describing the function of cambios).
Considering the Latin American source of many drugs, it is not surprising that
many forfeiture cases have involved cambios. See, e.g., United States v. $173,081.04 in
U.S. Currency, 835 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 850 (1988); United States
v. All Funds Presently on Deposit, 832 F. Supp. 542 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
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under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A)-(B) and 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)."
The claimant conceded that probable cause existed to believe that
some of the funds in the seized account were proceeds of money
laundering, 9 and the government conceded that most of the
claimant's transactions were legitimate.' The court held that the
legitimate money provided a "cover" for transfers of the tainted
money and was thus subject to forfeiture for "facilitat[ing] the
illegal activity."'"
The scope of the theory was developed further in United
States v. Certain Funds on Deposit in Account No. 01-0-71417'
and United States v. Certain Accounts.' Certain Funds involved
fraud by the owners of a federal credit union. The government
sought forfeiture of five bank accounts, alleging that the funds
they contained either were the proceeds of a crime against a fi-
nancial institution' or were, under the facilitation theory, in-
volved in money laundering transactions." The court agreed and
held the entire balances to be subject to forfeiture under the facili-
tation theory, adding that even if only part of the legitimate mon-
ey facilitated the offense, the entire sum was subject to forfeit-
ure.
86
In Certain Accounts, money launderers had employed "smurfs"
to buy money orders below the reporting threshold of 31 U.S.C.
§ 5322.' Some of the money orders were then deposited in bank
accounts ("direct recipient accounts") in New York and Florida.'
The government sought forfeiture of the direct accounts under the
78. All Monies, 754 F. Supp. at 1469-71.
79. Id. at 1472.
80. Id. at 1475.
81. Id. at 1475-76.
82. 769 F. Supp. 80 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
83. 795 F. Supp. 391 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 1992).
85. Certain Funds, 769 F. Supp. at 82.
86. Id. at 84.
87. Certain Accounts, 795 F. Supp. at 392-93. When Congress first required banks to
report large cash transactions, money launderers tried to avoid the regulations by break-
ing large amounts of currency into portions below the $10,000 threshold and having sub-
ordinates (known as "smurfs," after the small, blue cartoon characters) make the deposits.
See generally Welling, supra note 62 (describing the development of smurfing and the leg-
islative response to it). Certain Accounts stemmed from the arrest of a smurf who tried
to assault a customs agent with a machine gun. When arrested, the smurf had receipts
for approximately one million dollars in money orders. Certain Accounts, 795 F. Supp. at
393.
88. Certain Accounts, 795 F. Supp. at 393.
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facilitation theory. 9 However, checks drawn on the direct ac-
counts had been deposited into other accounts ("indirect recipient
accounts"), and the government sought forfeiture of the entire bal-
ances of these accounts, too.90 The court followed All Monies to
the extent of allowing forfeiture of the direct accounts, but held
that the mere tracing of checks into an indirect account was insuf-
ficient to justify forfeiture of the entire balance.91 Asserting that
forfeitability was not analogous to contamination radiating out-
wards from an account like a "contagious disease," the court rejec-
ted the extension of the facilitation theory with regard to the indi-
rect accounts, saying that probable cause was too "attenuated." 92
B. The Argument Behind the Facilitation Theory
The simple statement of the facilitation theory obscures two
interpretive leaps. First, one must construe section 981 to reach
facilitating property, even though it nowhere contains the word
"facilitate."'93 Second, one must conclude that the mere commin-
gling of funds amounts to such facilitation.94 Neither one of these
leaps is obvious. Moreover, even after the word "facilitate" is read
into the statute. its meaning is hardly self-evident. For these rea-
sons, considerable uncertainty has accompanied application of the
theory.95
The conclusion that the statute covers property that "facili-
tates" money laundering is usually supported by reference to the
legislative history of section 981. Section 981(a)(1)(A) originally
subjected to forfeiture only the direct or indirect "gross receipts"
of money laundering,96 but the statute was amended in 1988 to
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 397-98.
92. Id. at 398. The court further noted that the broader theory could be limited only
by the government's imagination. Id.
93. United States v. All Monies ($477,048.62) in Account No. 90-3617-3, 754 F.
Supp. 1467, 1472 (D. Haw. 1991).
94. Id. at 1475-76.
95. Compare United States v. $448,342.85, 969 F.2d 474, 476-77 (7th Cir. 1992) (re-
jecting facilitation theory under 18 U.S.C. § 981) with United States v. Certain Funds on
Deposit in Account No. 01-0-71417, 769 F. Supp. 80, 84 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding entire
balances in accounts subject to forfeiture even if only part of the money facilitated mon-
ey laundering) and Certain Accounts, 795 F. Supp. at 397-98 (holding subject to forfeiture
only accounts into which tainted funds were directly deposited).
96. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, tit. I, subtit. H,
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reach all property "involved in" a violation of the money laun-
dering or currency transaction reporting statutes. 97 The cases ap-
plying the facilitation theory cite the Senate Judiciary Committee's
analysis of the amendment," which states that "the term 'proper-
ty involved' is intended to include the money or other property
being laundered (the corpus), any commissions or fees paid to the
launderer, and any property used to facilitate the laundering of-
fense."99
Having construed section 981 to reach facilitating property,
courts have then focused on the meaning of "facilitate" instead of
the language of the statute.1' ° Because courts have defined "facil-
itation" broadly, prosecutors have argued successfully that mixing
clean and dirty money facilitates money laundering. Facilitation
has been identified as "making the prohibited conduct less difficult
or 'more or less free from obstruction or hindrance.' " This
definition came from cases interpreting the drug forfeiture stat-
ute,"~ which expressly provides for forfeiture of facilitating prop-
erty.
103
In its original context, this definition has caused the forfeiture
of assets related only indirectly to crime. For example, in United
States v. Rivera,"° a case involving criminal forfeiture of property
facilitating drug trafficking under 21 U.S.C. § 853,"5 the court
§ 1366(a), 100 Stat. 3207-18, 3207-35 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992)).
97. Pub. L. No. 100-690, tit. VI, § 6463(a)(1), 102 Stat. 4374 (18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(1)(A) (1988)).
98. See, e.g., Certain Accounts, 795 F. Supp. at 396 n.10; All Monies, 754 F. Supp. at
1473; United States v. Certain Funds on Deposit in Account No. 01-0-71417, 769 F.
Supp. 80, 84 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing All Monies, 754 F. Supp. at 1473).
99. 134 CONG. REc. S17, 365 (Nov. 10, 1988).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Eleven Vehicles, 836 F. Supp. 1147, 1153 (E.D. Pa.
1993); All Monies, 754 F. Supp. at 1473.
101. United States v. 3639-2nd St., N.E., 869 F.2d 1093, 1096 (8th Cir. 1989); see also
United States v. Schifferli, 895 F.2d 987, 990 (4th Cir. 1990).
102. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
103. See, e.g., Schifferli, 895 F.2d at 990; 3639-2nd St., N.E., 869 F.2d at 1096.
104. 884 F.2d 544 (11th Cir: 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1018 (1990).
105. This statute is the criminal counterpart to 21 U.S.C. § 881, the civil drug forfei-
ture statute. It provides that when someone is convicted of a drug felony, that person
forfeits, among other things, any "property used, or intended to be used, in any manner
or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such violation." 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(a)(2) (1988). Because of the common context, the interpretation of the word "facil-
itate" under 21 U.S.C. § 853 is relevant to the scope of the facilitation theory under 18
U.S.C. § 981.
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upheld a jury verdict of forfeiture of twenty-seven horses on the
ground that the claimant's horse business provided a "cover" for
drug dealing." The court noted that the claimant had used
terms from the horse-breeding business as code words in arranging
the distribution of heroin. Interestingly, the jury found that the
ranch where the defendant arranged the drug deals was not sub-
ject to forfeiture. 7 A more extreme example is United States v.
One Lot Jewelry, in which the court held that the claimant's jew-
elry had facilitated drug dealing by "enhanc[ing] his status in the
drug community.""
Substantial litigation has taken place over the degree of con-
nection required between the property sought to be forfeited and
the underlying criminal offense." 9 Some courts require that the
government establish probable cause to believe that the property
has a "substantial connection" to one of the crimes defined in
section 881 for the seizure to stand."0 Other courts have adopted
a looser test, requiring only that the government demonstrate a
nexus between the seized property and illegal drug activity."' It
has been suggested that the distinction is more semantic than
substantive, with the real issue being whether facilitation, as de-
fined above, has occurred."' The cases do agree that to be sub-
ject to forfeiture, "the property must have more than an incidental
or fortuitous connection to criminal activity."1 3
Finally, although the connection between the illegal activity
and the property needs to be more than de minimis, the amount
of illegal activity generally does not."4 This rule may change in
the future, however, considering the Supreme Court's recent deci-
106. Rivera, 884 F.2d at 546.
107. Id.
108. 749 F. Supp. 118, 123 (W.D.N.C. 1990).
109. See United States v. 42450 Highway 441, 920 F.2d 900, 902 (11th Cir. 1991).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Schifferli, 895 F.2d 987, 989 (4th Cir. 1990); United
States v. One 1990 Porsche Carrera, 807 F. Supp. 371, 373 (D. Md. 1992).
111. E.g., United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 55 (2d Cir. 1993).
112. 42450 Highway 441, 920 F.2d at 902-03.
113. Id. at 903; Schifferli, 895 F.2d at 990.
114. United States v. 3639-2nd St., 869 F.2d 1093, 1096 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding rela-
tive smallness of amount of cocaine sold to be irrelevant to issue of forfeiture of home);
see also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (upholding
forfeiture of yacht under Puerto Rican statute when one marijuana cigarette was found
on board).
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sion in Austin v. United States. 5 In Austin, the Court held that
civil forfeiture was punitive in part and thus subject to the Eighth
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause." 6 However, the Court ex-
plicitly declined to establish a test for identifying unconstitutionally
excessive forfeitures." 7 Concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia
suggested that the Constitution requires only that the asset subject
to forfeiture bear a sufficiently close relationship to the underlying
offense."' If Justice Scalia's view is correct, the definition of "fa-
cilitation" may be critical to establishing the constitutional limits to
forfeiture.
The drug cases developed a very broad idea of the kind of
facilitation that would subject property to forfeiture. When "facili-
tation" was read into the money laundering forfeiture statute, the
broad notion came with it. The result was to give prosecutors
expansive authority to seize assets and seek forfeiture.
C. The Influence of Facilitation Theory Under 18 U.S.C. § 981
Prosecutors have enjoyed mixed success in achieving forfeiture
of bank accounts under section 981 under the facilitation theo-
ry."9 On the one hand, several courts have applied the theory to
justify forfeiture of the entire balance of bank accounts containing
proceeds of violations of the money laundering statutes, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956 and 18 U.S.C. § 1957.12 On the other hand, most at-
tempts to apply the theory to accounts containing proceeds of
other offenses have failed, and some courts have rejected the
theory altogether.'
Some courts have adopted the facilitation theory when the
evidence has suggested that the mixture -of funds was purposeful.
For example, in United States v. Contents of Account Numbers
208-06070 and 208-06068-1-2, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York found that the number of bank ac-
counts opened during the defendant's illegal scheme was evidence
that the accounts were intended to disguise the proceeds of the
115. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
116. Id. at 2812.
117. Id.
118. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
119. All the forfeiture cases in this Section involve actions under 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
120. See infra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 126-43 and accompanying text.
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scheme." Because "[a]ny legitimate money in the Six Accounts
would serve to further disguise the source of the illegitimate funds
and to make the proceeds of the ... scheme more difficult to
trace," the court held that all funds in the accounts were forfeit-
able as facilitating property." Similarly, in United States v.
Tencer, the trial court upheld the seizure of all funds in certain
bank accounts, 24 concluding that the tainted money had been
mixed with legitimate funds "for the purpose of concealing the
defendant's alleged criminal activities.""
Other courts, while agreeing with the facilitation theory in the
abstract, have denied forfeiture, saying either that the property
involved was too remote from the underlying crime or that the
theory did not apply to the substantive offense in the case. For
example, in United States v. All Funds on Deposit,126 the district
court held that violations of the currency transaction reporting and
anti-smurfing statutes 27 were not the sort of crimes that could be
facilitated by deposits of untainted money in a bank account. The
government established probable cause that some deposits had
illegally been structured to avoid the reporting requirements, and
those deposits were subject to forfeiture under section 981."2 In
denying forfeiture of the rest of the money, the court explained
that it could not understand how the legitimate money already in
the account facilitated the other, illegal deposits. 29 In another
case, Marine Midland Bank, N.A v. United States, the district court
held that the entire balance of an interbank account was not sub-
ject to forfeiture when the government made "no allegations that
such actount is controlled, nominally or effectively, by anyone with
122. 847 F. Supp. 329, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
123. Id.
124. Crim. A. No. 92-570, 1993 WL 310527, at *3-*4 (E.D. La. Aug. 11, 1993) (in-
volving forfeiture under § 981 and its criminal counterpart, 18 U.S.C. § 982). The court
cited Certain Accounts, Certain Funds, and All Monies as support for its conclusion.
125. Tencer, 1993 WL 310527 at *5 n.15.
126. 804 F. Supp. 444, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
127. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313, 5324 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
128. All Funds on Deposit, 804 F. Supp. at 446.
129. Id. at 447. The court called the theory "completely logical" in the context of
money laundering, but the government had predicated forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992) on violation of the CTR statutes, not money laundering. Id.;
accord United States v. Account No. 50-2830-2, 857 F. Supp. 1534, 1540 (M.D. Ala.
1994) (holding that deposits in violation of CTR statute do not subject legitimate money
in account to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981). Contra United States v. Certain Ac-
counts, 795 F. Supp. 391, 397 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
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even a partially illegal purpose."13 Accordingly, the court held
that only the funds traceable to illegal activity were subject to
forfeiture under section 981.131
Finally, some courts have simply rejected facilitation theory as
a ground for forfeiture of otherwise untainted money. In United
States v. $448,342.85,132 prosecutors sought forfeiture of the entire
balances of bank accounts that contained both laundered proceeds
of fraud and untainted money. Judge Easterbrook specifically
disapproved of Certain Funds and All Monies, asserting that "the
presence of one illegal dollar in an, account does not taint the
rest-as if the dollar obtained from fraud were like a drop of ink
falling into a glass of water., 133 Judge Easterbrook described an
account as "a routing device like the address of a building" and
said that to hold that the account facilitated laundering of money
deposited into it was unacceptable because it turned the account
into a deodand.1t3
Statutory interpretation was the basis for rejecting facilitation
theory in United States v. All Funds Presently on Deposit35 The
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York found
the theory suspect because the word "facilitate" appeared in sec-
tion 881(a)(6) but not in the later-enacted section
981(a)(1)(A) 36 The basis for the decision, though, was that the
court believed facilitation theory to be incompatible with 18 U.S.C.
§ 984. That section made it unnecessary for prosecutors to identify
precisely fungible property subject to forfeiture, instead allowing
130. Nos. 93 Civ. 0307, 0357, 1993 WL 158542, *7-*8 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1993), affd
in part, remanded in part, 11 F.3d 1119 (2d Cir. 1993). The case involved the seizure of
an account used between banks to clear checks. The Panama branch of a British bank
holding company would collect, sort, and microfilm checks and money orders, and then
forward them for payment to the institutions on which they were drawn. Id. at *1.
Checks drawn on banks in the United States were sent to the bank's account at Marine
Midland Bank in New York. That account, called an interbank account, was the subject
of the forfeiture action. Id. The complaint alleged that "a substantial majority of the
Postal money orders negotiated through the defendant-in-rem account were in $500, $600,
and $700 denominations, 'were purchased over consecutive days and bore accounting
symbols used by Colombian drug cartels.'" Id. at *2.
131. Id. at *8.
132. 969 F.2d 474, 475-76 (7th Cir. 1992).
133. Id. at 476.
134. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 13-15; supra note 25 and accompanying
text.
135. 832 F. Supp. 542 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
136. Id. at 559.
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them to seize identical property found in the same place where
forfeitable property had been. It was enacted in 1988,137 in re-
sponse to cases like United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, in
which the trial court faced complicated problems in tracing drug
proceeds. 38
The court in All Funds Presently on Deposit concluded from
the legislative history of section 984 that Congress did not believe
that commingling was an independent basis for forfeiture.'39 The
court also held that the facilitation theory would gut the one-year
statute of limitations provided in section 984,14° because every
deposit would become an independent wrongful act, resetting the
statute of limitations for forfeiture.'41 The court found further
137. Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act, Pub. L. No. 102-550, tit. XV,
§ 1522, 106 Stat. 4044-63 (1988).
138. 797 F.2d 1154 (2d Cir. 1986). Banco Cafetero involved tracing proceeds of drug
dealing through bank accounts. The court held that when drug money was deposited in a
bank account and then withdrawals and deposits were made, only the lowest intermediate
account balance after the deposit of drug money could be considered proceeds of drug
dealing (the "drugs-in last-out" rule). Id. at 1159-60 & n.5. This rule encourages money
launderers to put money in accounts with wildly fluctuating balances: after the balance
dipped to zero, all subsequent deposits would be immune from forfeiture, but because
the money would be quickly replenished, the funds would still be available for withdraw-
al after the account had "zeroed out."
139. All Funds Presently on Deposit, 832 F. Supp. at 560. The court cited a section of
the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 984 (Supp. IV 1992) to the effect that prosecutors
had problems tracing drug proceeds because it was impossible to identify dirty money
after it had been mixed with other funds. All Funds Presently on Deposit, 832 F. Supp.
at 560. The court reasoned that there would be no need to identify specific property
subject to forfeiture if the entire mixture were forfeitable under a facilitation theory. But
cf. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983) ("[I]t is well settled that 'the views
of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier
one.'" (citations omitted)).
140. 18 U.S.C. § 984(c) (Supp. IV 1992).
141. All Funds Presently on Deposit, 832 F. Supp. at 561. The example given by the
court is helpful:
Assume that on January 1, 1995, $100 in drug money and $500 in legiti-
mate money-money that the government has no basis for alleging as being
derived from specified unlawful activity-is deposited into an account. On Feb-
ruary 1, 1995, the account balance dips to zero. On March 1, 1995, the account
climbs to $1,000; once again, the government has no basis for believing that the
most recently deposited funds are the proceeds of some specified unlawful activ-
ity. The government seeks to forfeit the account on March 2, 1995. If Banco
Cafetero were the governing law, none of the money would be subject to forfei-
ture because the unlawful activity occurred before the account "zeroed out."
Under Section 984, which allows the government one year in which to forfeit
fungible property, $100 is subject to forfeiture as a substitute for the fungible
property that was actually involved in the specified unlawful activity. Facilitation
theory would allow seizure of the legitimate funds which were commingled with
the tainted funds; although it is not exactly clear whether the amount subject to
forfeiture would be $900 (the balance now in the account) or $500 (the balance
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support in United States v. $448,342.85141 for its conclusion that
these difficulties were fatal to the facilitation theory. 43
III. INTENT AND THE LIMITS OF FACILITATION THEORY
Congress has expressed a clear desire to attack drug dealing
and money laundering, and facilitation theory gives prosecutors a
powerful weapon in the fight. However, the broad facilitation
theory casts an extremely wide net, and when coupled with the
looseness of the procedural safeguards that accompany civil forfei-
ture, creates opportunities for serious abuses. Innocent third par-
ties can suffer substantial deprivations of property, and criminals
might suffer automatic deprivations of all property. Further, if
commingling alone is grounds for forfeiture, then facilitation theo-
ry rests on the fiction of the property as wrongdoer, a fiction that
has never been accepted in the United States.1"
Facilitation theory can be made both coherent and fairer by
focusing on the intent of the possessor of the money. Although
the intent requirement is implicit in many existing cases, making it
explicit would provide greater protection for innocent persons from
the burdens of seizure and of defending against forfeiture. Because
many courts seem implicitly to have looked to intent in some way,
moreover, requiring a showing of intent would not greatly increase
the burden on prosecutors. By using intent as a standard, courts
would also prevent the facilitation theory from depriving criminals
of all property.
originally deposited in the account), there is a strong argument that if forfeiture
is premised on the commingling and hiding of illegitimate funds, the entire bal-
ance currently in the account would be forfeit.
Now assume that the government did not seize the account on March 2,
1995 but instead waited until January 2, 1996. Clearly, with respect to the $100
and the $500 deposited into the account on January 1, 1995 the one-year period
has expired; however, since $1000 replaced the funds in the account on March
1, 1995, the government is still within the one-year statute of limitations for for-
feiture of that "facilitating property."
Id.
142. 969 F.2d 474, 476-77 (7th Cir. 1992).
143. All Funds, 832 F. Supp. at 561-62.
144. Despite the statements of some courts that seem to indicate the contrary, see
supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text, the doctrine of inanimate objects as wrongdo-
ers, or deodands, has never been a part of American law. See supra note 25. The Su-
preme Court has said that to the extent that property has been regarded as a wrongdoer,
it has always been as a proxy for the owner's conduct. Austin v. United States, 113 S.
Ct. 2801, 2809 (1993).
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A. The Dangers of the Broad Facilitation Theory
The problem with a facilitation theory that does not consider
intent is that such a theory has no limits. According to the prose-
cutors who seize money under this theory, dirty money taints the
clean money with which it is mixed. Every check written on an
account containing dirty money is itself dirty money, and taints
any account into which it is deposited, and so on. 4 ' Shortly, the
taint metastasizes to all of a person's assets, 46 and probably to
the assets of those who have dealt with the criminal. 47 Although
many courts have refused to take this theory to its logical ex-
treme, 4" they have not announced a limiting principle. Absent
such a principle, the desire for logical consistency is a force
tending towards broad application of the theory.
Admittedly, Congress intends to treat money launderers se-
verely and to strip the drug trade of the incentive of profit. The
broad facilitation theory helps prosecutors seize assets that might
be unreachable under a narrower interpretation of the statute. 49
Further, by increasing the scope of forfeiture, the broad facilitation
theory increases its deterrent effect.
The effects of the broad facilitation theory, however, do not
fall solely on money launderers and those who deal with them.
The theory also exposes to seizure many assets in the hands of
those who cannot reasonably be expected to do anything about
drug dealing or money laundering. If mere mixture of clean and
dirty money amounts to facilitation of money laundering, probable
cause exists to believe that virtually any asset has facilitated mon-
ey laundering. The effect is to give prosecutors open-ended discre-
tion to seize assets almost at will. This power is even more trou-
145. See United States v. $448,342.85, 969 F.2d 474, 476 (7th Cir. 1992) (reasoning
that under facilitation theory, tainted money in an account becomes like ink contaminat-
ing water into which it is dropped); United States v. Certain Accounts, 795 F. Supp. 391,
398 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (comparing tainted money under facilitation theory to a contagious
disease).
146. See Certain Accounts, 795 F. Supp. at 398.
147. See id. at 398 n.12. ("If a direct accountholder were to write a check to pay bills
from Florida Power & Light, or the University of Florida, or made unsolicited donations
to members of the Miami police force, each of these 'claimants" accounts would be sub-
ject to arrest and forfeiture.").
148. E.g., id. at 398.
149. United States v. Eleven Vehicles, 836 F. Supp. 1147, 1154-55 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
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bling considering that proceeds of forfeiture go into the budgets of
law enforcement agencies. 5
An expansive interpretation of "facilitation" is even more
dangerous under the money laundering forfeiture statute than it is
under the drug trafficking statute5 . for just this reason. An asset
may be subject to forfeiture for having been involved in a drug
deal, but there is no plausible claim that everything done with that
asset following the illegal transaction necessarily facilitated that
transaction. A car, for example, may be subject to forfeiture for
having once transported drugs, but no one would assert that other
assets would become tainted simply by putting them in the trunk
one week after the drug deal. In the case of money laundering,
though, every transaction involving dirty money adds another step
that law enforcement agents must trace to connect that money to
a crime. The broad facilitation theory claims that every transaction
is thus an independent act of facilitation, tainting all other assets
involved in the transaction.
Ultimately, because of the ease with which taint spreads from
asset to asset, the broad facilitation theory effectively would work
a revival of forfeiture of estate, whereby felons and traitors were
anciently divested of the right to own property. The reason is
that the innocent owner defense5 . is not available to those with
150. See 28 U.S.C. § 524(c) (Supp. V 1993) (creating special fund, containing proceeds
of forfeiture, available for law enforcement); see also United States v. James Daniel
Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993), in which the Court noted,
The extent of the Government's financial stake in drug forfeiture is ap-
parent from a 1990 memo, in which the Attorney General urged United States
Attorneys to increase the volume of forfeitures in order to meet the Depart-
ment of Justice's annual budget target:
"We must significantly increase production to reach our budget target.
... Failure to achieve the $470 million projection would expose the
Department's forfeiture program to criticism and undermine confidence in our
budget projections. Every effort must be made to increase forfeiture income
during the remaining three months of [fiscal year] 1990."
Id. at 502 n.2 (quoting Executive Office for United States Attorneys, U.S. Dep't of Jus-
tice, 38 U.S. ATr'Ys BULL. 180 (1990) (alteration in original)). This sort of "reinvest-
ment" has been described as giving "an entirely new meaning to the expression, 'you eat
what you kill.'" Fine, supra note 77, at 1127 n.8.
151. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18; see also United States v. Pole No.
3172, 852 F.2d 636, 639-40 (1st Cir. 1988) (rejecting forfeiture of entire interest in prop-
erty when mortgage payments made with proceeds of drug trade because 21 U.S.C. § 881
ought not to be construed to deny accused drug dealers the right to own property).
153. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2) (1988).
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knowledge of the underlying illegal activity." 4 If every asset a
money launderer owns is tainted by the facilitation theory, but he
is deprived of all defenses, then he has in effect been denied the
right to own property. However, Congress explicitly abolished
forfeiture of estate in 1790;... courts should not lightly read its
revival into current forfeiture statutes.
For those not engaged in lawbreaking, the innocent owner
defense provides some protection from forfeiture but not from sei-
zure. 1 6 Innocent owners could thus be deprived of the use of
property until the opportunity to demonstrate innocence arose,
possibly incurring substantial harm. 7 The problem is even worse
154. United States v. Eleven Vehicles, 836 F. Supp. 1147, 1160 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (citing
United States v. 717 S. Woodward St., 2 F.3d 529, 533 (3d Cir. 1993)); see also United
States v. 21090 Boulder Circle, No. 92-1589, 1993 WL 432376, at *3-*4 (6th Cir. Oct. 25,
1993) (upholding forfeiture of house based on facilitation theory, when owner knew of
structuring violation involving money used to purchase house).
155. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 57. The protection is limited, however, because of the shifted
burden of proof. See supra note 57.
The cases assume that the defense is available for owners of facilitating funds. See,
e.g., United States v. All Funds Presently on Deposit, 832 F. Supp. 542, 562 n.16
(E.D.N.Y. 1993). However, this may be inconsistent with the notion that commingling of
funds is itself a wrongful act of facilitation. To seize property, the government must have
probable cause to believe that it is subject to forfeiture. See supra text accompanying
notes 68-70. If probable cause is established as to facilitating property merely by showing
that it was found in the same place, two possible implications arise: either the property is
subject to forfeiture regardless of any person's culpability, in which case an innocent
owner defense makes no sense, or the mere fact of admixture provides probable cause to
believe that someone was culpable, and the burden of proof shifts to the owner to show
that it was not he. If the law of the United States does not recognize deodands, Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974), the second alternative
must be correct.
157. The harm could be simply financial, such as the loss of the opportunity to earn
interest on seized money, but may be as severe as the loss of one's home. For examples
of large cash seizures in which only small amounts were connected to crimes, see All
Funds Presently on Deposit, 832 F. Supp. at 563-64 (claimant deprived of use of
$1,200,000 but probable cause shown only as to $75,000); Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v.
United States, Nos. 93 Civ. 0307, 0357, 1993 WL 158542, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1993),
affd in part, remanded in part, 11 F.3d 1119 (2d. Cir. 1993). In United States v. Certain
Accounts, 795 F. Supp. 391 (S.D. Fla. 1992), the court observed,
There exists a real possibility that unknowing and factually innocent
accountholders who have received an allegedly tainted deposit may be deprived
of the use of the funds until such time as they can assert the innocent owner
defense .... [The action may proceed for months or perhaps years with no
showing that the accountholder had any knowledge of the money laundering.
Id. at 395. The government argued that in addition to the innocent owner defense, prose-
cutorial discretion in bringing suit protected owners. Id. at 398 n.12. The court held that
this protection was inadequate. Id. at 398.
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because the government bears a very light burden in civil forfei-
ture cases. 58 In contrast, following seizure, the owner has the
burden of proving a negative: he must prove either that the prop-
erty was not involved in money laundering..9 or that he did not
know of'or consent to any criminal activity. 6"
The broad facilitation theory thus gives prosecutors enormous
power to impose costs and threaten extensive forfeiture, based
only on probable cause. Further, once probable cause is estab-
lished, the government can seize assets and sit on them, investigat-
ing the underlying criminal allegations later.' These problems
are compounded by the difficulty of challenging a proposed forfei-
ture under an uncertain standard."2 Considering both the conflict
of interest faced by prosecutors who stand to benefit from forfei-
ture and the potential for abuse against unpopular defendants, the
broad facilitation theory is too dangerous.
B. Intent as the Determinative Element
Despite the foregoing problems, the fact remains that money
from legitimate sources can be used in laundering dirty money. 63
For example, in All Monies, the case in which the facilitation
theory was first applied, the claimant was the owner of a Peruvian
money exchange. The facts of the case suggest that the claimant
knew that the transactions through his accounts were unusual and
158. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70.
159. 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1988).
160. See supra text accompanying note 57.
161. In United States v. All Funds on Deposit in Great Eastern Bank, 804 F. Supp.
444, 447 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), the prosecutors argued that even if seizure of some of the
money in an account could not be justified under a facilitation theory, the government
hoped that discovery would produce evidence that the money had been involved in a
crime.
162. Judges declining to apply facilitation theory in a particular case have explained
their decisions in terms of remoteness from the underlying criminal activity. E.g., United
States v. Certain Accounts, 795 F. Supp. 391, 398 (S.D. Ha. 1992) ("As the account in
question becomes more distant from the initial illegal transaction, so too does probable
cause to forfeit become more attenuated."); see also Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v.
United States, Nos. 93 Civ. 0307, 0357, 1993 WL 158542, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1993)
(citing Certain Accounts, 795 F. Supp. at 398), affd in part, remanded in part, 11 F.3d
1119 (2d Cir. 1993).
163. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Funds on Deposit, 769 F. Supp. 80, 84-85
(E.D.N.Y. 1991) ("Criminal activity such as money laundering largely depends upon the
use of legitimate monies .... It is precisely the commingling of tainted funds with legiti-
mate money that facilitates the laundering and enables it to continue.").
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that transfers of legitimate funds really did provide "cover" for
proceeds of drug trafficking."64 The problem is to distinguish au-
thentic facilitation from mere commingling.
Some courts, interpreting facilitation under the drug forfeiture
statute,"6 have held that to be subject to forfeiture, assets must
have a "substantial connection [to] the underlying criminal activi-
ty.' 166 One might try similarly to limit facilitation theory under
the money laundering statute, 167 but the test is not useful in that
context for two reasons. First, the decisions do not make clear
what constitutes a substantial connection."6 Second, and more
importantly, the point of facilitation theory is that the mere com-
mingling of funds is an independent act of facilitation;69 of ne-
cessity, the newly tainted money bears a substantial connection to
that act of facilitation.
A test asking whether the commingling of funds substantially
facilitated money laundering would solve some, but not all, of the
problems of the "substantial connection" test. The "substantial
facilitation" test seems to reduce the likelihood of contamination
of property belonging to innocent persons by transactions two or
three times removed from money laundering. However, the mean-
ing of the word "substantial" is no more self-evident in this con-
text than in the original test.
There is a more fundamental flaw in the "substantial facilita-
tion" test, though. The more innocent the recipient of money ap-
peared, paradoxically, the more substantially the transaction would
facilitate money laundering.1 70 The in rem nature of forfeiture ac-
164. United States v. All Monies ($477,048.62) in Account No. 90-3617-3, 754 F.
Supp. 1467, 1473-75 (D. Haw. 1991).
165. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
166. E.g., United States v. Schifferli, 895 F.2d 987, 989 (4th Cir. 1990); see supra text
accompanying notes 110-13.
167. Cf. All Monies, 754 F. Supp. at 1475 ("Property may not be considered to have
facilitated illegal activity unless there is a substantial connection between the property
and the illegal activity.").
168. See United States v. RD 1, Box 1, 952 F.2d 53, 57 n.5 (3d Cir. 1991) (suggetting
that the distinctions made in various tests are merely semantic). Similar problems exist in
the original context of drug forfeiture. See supra text accompanying notes 110-13.
169. See United States v. All Funds Presently on Deposit, 832 F. Supp. 542, 560-61
(E.D.N.Y. 1993) (observing that each act of mixing funds would reset the statute of
limitations).
170. For example, suppose a drug dealer pays his electric bill with the profits of his
business, intending that such a commonplace transaction will let him use his gains incon-
spicuously. His transaction constitutes money laundering. See, e.g., United States v. Gar-
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tions has always been recognized as a fiction, serving as a proxy
for some person's culpability. 7' By looking at the degree of facil-
itation while ignoring intent, the "substantial facilitation" test could
ratify the fiction while dispensing with reality.
The only standard that would truly protect the innocent is a
test that would ask whether the possessor of the facilitating funds
intended to facilitate money laundering at the time of commingling.
This standard would clearly demarcate the limits of facilitation
theory. Moreover, it also would prevent modern forfeiture laws
from implicitly working a revival of forfeiture of estate, by giving
claimants who are not entirely innocent a way to show that some
of their assets did not meet the legal standard for facilitation.
The clarity of the intent-based standard would provide impor-
tant protection. By plainly removing assets from the scope of for-
feiture when prosecutors do not have probable cause to believe
that the owner intended to facilitate money laundering, it would
avert seizures of property that would not ultimately be subject to
forfeiture. 2 It also would deprive prosecutors of the power in
terrorem to induce settlements by those who cannot afford to be
without seized property that may not be subject to forfeiture. It
further would provide claimants with a concrete way to defend
against forfeiture actions, in contrast with the present vagaries of
the remoteness test.
Even though conditioning forfeiture on the possessor's intent
would be a good policy, the statutory language does not self-evi-
dently support it. Nonetheless, examination of intent would not
merely be a judicial accretion to the statutory scheme. Why this is
cia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469, 1474 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that intent to conceal illegal
source of assets turns a transaction into illegal money laundering). Since the money looks
much more innocent after being deposited in the electric company's account than it did
in the hands of the drug dealer, the utility's mixing of funds would seem to have sub-
stantially, but innocently, facilitated money laundering. Cf. United States v. Certain Ac-
counts, 795 F. Supp. 391, 398 n.12 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (observing that facilitation theory
would subject to seizure the account of a utility after a money launderer used tainted
money to pay his bill).
171. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2808-10 (1993).
172. Seizures in which the government "make[s] no allegations that [the asset] is con-
trolled, nominally or effectively, by anyone with even a partially illegal purpose," Marine
Midland Bank, N.A. v. United States, Nos. 93 Civ. 0307, 0357, 1993-WL 158542, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1993), affid in part, remanded in part, 11 F.3d 1119 (2d Cir. 1993),
are not extreme hypotheticals. Marine Midland involved a seizure of nearly eight million
dollars under exactly those circumstances. Id.; see supra notes 130-31 and accompanying
text.
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so is made clearer by asking what is facilitated. The answer is,
money laundering. The forfeiture statute 73 provides for forfeiture
of property "involved in" money laundering, and facilitation theory
is based on the notion that property that facilitates money laun-
dering is involved in it. 74 Yet the offense of money laundering is
defined by statute as follows:
[C]onduct[ing] or attempt[ing] to conduct [a transaction]
which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activi-
ty-(A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified
unlawful activity; or ... (B) knowing that the transaction is
designed ... (i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location,
the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds.175
Defining facilitation of this offense is particularly tricky be-
cause the property involved is money. The point of laundering
money is to become able to spend and invest it, but it does not
follow that any action taken with the money for the launderer's
benefit subsequent to an illegal transaction has facilitated that
earlier, illegal transaction.7 6 Merely mixing clean and dirty mon-
ey should not in itself be grounds for forfeiture. On the other
hand, if the possessor of the money has the statutorily required
intent when the commingling occurs, a new violation of the statute
has occurred. In that case, the facilitation is wrongful, and the
strongest case for forfeiture exists.
The intent test explains clearly why an interbank account
involved in routine transactions is not subject to forfeiture,'77 but
why all funds in a transaction made by someone suspected of
money laundering are forfeitable."7 Probable cause for seizure
would also exist when a person accepts a large cash payment from
173. 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
174. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
175. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV. 1992) (emphases added).
176. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 946 (10th Cir.) (rejecting broad
construction of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) because the government's ver-
sion would criminalize spending money, not laundering it), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 142
(1991).
177. Cf Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. United States, Nos. 93 Civ. 0307, 0357, 1993
WL 158542 at *8, (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1993) (finding interbank account not subject to
seizure or forfeiture), affd in part, remanded in part, 11 F.3d 1119 (2d Cir. 1993).
178. Cf. United States v. All Monies ($477,048.62) in Account No. 90-3617-3, 754 F.
Supp. 1467, 1475-76 (D. Haw. 1991) (ordering forfeiture of money that had been in-
volved in suspicious transfers made by Peruvian money exchanger).
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someone who has no known legally acquired assets. If the pay-
ment were subsequently divided between several existing accounts,
probable cause would exist that the recipient was trying to hide
the money among legitimate accounts, rendering the accounts
subject to seizure. Finally, in most cases, the government will be
able to establish probable cause as to all of a money launderer's
accounts merely by showing probable cause that the person was
laundering money. The new standard would give the launderer an
opportunity after seizure to defend against forfeiture by showing
that he was not laundering money in a transaction, but merely
spending or investing it.
These examples assume that knowledge, not purpose, is suffi-
cient intent to support forfeiture. Arguably, based on the history
of forfeiture, the required scienter could be as low as negli-
gence. 9 However, the distinction between innocent commingling
of funds and wrongful facilitation of money laundering'" indi-
cates that the proper standard is knowledge.' 8' Knowledge is cir-
cumstantial evidence of purpose, moreover, and considering that
the government needs to show only probable cause to seize assets,
there will be very few cases that present a practical difference
between knowledge and purpose.
Admittedly, focus on intent is probably not required by the
Constitution. Forfeiture without an explicit showing of the owner's
wrongful intent or knowledge of criminal use is well established in
the United States." Although the Supreme Court recently held
in Austin that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of excessive
fines applies to forfeitures, Justice Scalia's concurrence suggested
that the Constitution may require only that to be subject to forfei-
179. See supra notes 30-31, 58 and accompanying text.
180. See supra text accompanying note 176.
181. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (specifying knowledge as
element of crime of money laundering).
182. See, e.g., J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510-11
(1921); Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 399 (1877) ("Nor is it neces-
sary that the owner of the property should have knowledge that the lessee and distiller
was committing fraud on the public revenue, in order that the information of forfeiture
should be maintained."); see also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S.
663, 680 (1974) (rejecting innocence of owner as defense to forfeiture under Puerto Rico
law). But cf Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2816 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) (forfeiture when owner has committed no wrong, intentional or negligent, would
raise "a serious constitutional question").
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ture, property must bear a sufficiently close relation to the under-
lying offense.'8
Further, concerns about those who neither knew about nor
consented to the underlying crime may be regarded as sufficiently
addressed by the innocent owner defense. Innocent parties, al-
though deprived of the use of their property until they can dem-
onstrate their innocence, ultimately lose only the proceeds of the
crime traced to the innocent owner plus the price of establishing
their defense. This penalty can be justified on the grounds that
those who deal with money launderers are in the best position to
do something about money laundering and that the threat of this
deprivation gives them an appropriate incentive."
However, any argument against intent as a standard, if it were
otherwise valid, would prove too much. If the facilitation theory as
advanced by prosecutors were valid, the entire Federal Reserve
system would theoretically be subject to seizure, regardless of
whether a bank or an account holder had personally dealt with a
criminal or not' Although courts would not likely uphold egre-
gious seizures, the prosecutors' argument leaves the courts with no
guidance in their decisions other than a particular judge's sense of
what constitutes an egregious seizure.
Moreover, the broader theory also provides little guidance to
prosecutors. Thus, prosecutors would have almost complete discre-
tion to seize large sums of money and make the owners try to get
it back. Even exercising the utmost integrity, a prosecutor has no
articulable standard to guide the limits of seizure under the facili-
tation theory. Further, some claimants will be unable to afford to
challenge forfeiture, especially after the money they need to hire
counsel has been seized by the government, and others will find
their defenses hindered by the lack of a clear standard. Consider-
183. See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2815 (Scalia, J., concurring).
184. Cf. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 671 (1975) (affirming conviction of re-
sponsible corporate officer for violation of Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of
1938, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), despite lack of criminal intent, be-
cause official can prevent violation "with no more care than society might reasonably
expect and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his
responsibilities" (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952))).
185. See Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. United States, Nos. 93 Civ. 0307, 0357, 1993
WL 158542, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1993) (observing that facilitation theory would
cause tainted funds to "wreak havoc upon the international banking system"), affd in
part, remanded in part, 11 F.3d 1119 (2d Cir. 1993).
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ing some of the prosecutors' incentives for broad seizure, 16
courts should not leave these decisions to prosecutors with so little
constraint, especially because Congress has not clearly expressed a
desire to give them such discretion.
Looking to intent would not substantially hinder prosecutors'
ability to reach assets that are truly involved in drug dealing or
money laundering. Proceeds of these crimes in the possession of
banks would remain subject to forfeiture, and the costs of defend-
ing actions for forfeiture of these assets should still give banks an
incentive to stay away from money launderers. As for money
launderers themselves, the government needs to show merely prob-
able cause to believe that an asset is subject to forfeiture before
shifting the burden to the owner to prove otherwise; 187 in many
cases, prosecutors would be able to make this initial showing as to
substantially all of a money launderer's assets. To require prosecu-
tors to show intent would be an extra burden, but it usually would
be light due to the low standard of proof. Moreover, prosecutors
must already show that at least one person had criminal intent,
because intent is an element of the substantive offense of money
laundering." Further, the fungible property forfeiture statute 8 9
drastically reduces criminals' ability to immunize assets from forfei-
ture by creatively shifting money around.
Ultimately, this proposed standard would not substantially
increase the burden on prosecutors, because many courts have
implicitly relied on intent already. In All Monies, the first facilita-
tion theory case, the court could infer intent to use the legitimate
funds to cover a transfer of tainted money because the claimant
had engaged in unusual transactions originating in a country
known to be a major source of drugs."l Conversely, in Marine
186. See supra note 150.
187. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
188. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Probable cause to believe that
an asset is involved in money laundering logically requires probable cause that money
laundering has occurred. See United States v. All of the Inventories of the Businesses
Known as Khalife Bros. Jewelry, 806 F. Supp. 648, 650-51 (E.D. Mich. 1992) ("[U]nder
18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) the government must establish probable cause to believe that a
substantial connection exists between the property to be forfeited ... and the facilitation
of illegal money laundering violations or currency reporting violations."). Probable cause
that the offense has been committed itself implies probable cause as to all the elements
of that offense.
189. 18 U.S.C. § 984 (Supp. IV 1992).
190. See United States v. All Monies ($477,048.62) in Account No. 90-3617-3, 754 F.
Supp. 1467, 1474-75 (D. Haw. 1991).
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Midland Bank, the court found that no intent was present when a
clearing bank bundled funds for transfer to the United States and
thus held that the untainted funds were not subject to seizure or
forfeiture.' 9'
Courts have already started to recognize this principle. In
United States v. Contents of Account Numbers 208-06070 &
208-06068-1-2,"9 the court treated intent as dispositive:
The facilitation theory is appropriate in the present case
where the government has demonstrated probable cause to be-
lieve that [the claimant] established and controlled the Six Ac-
counts [at issue in the forfeiture action], and commingled legiti-
mate and illegitimate funds in these accounts, for the purpose of
disguising the nature and source of the proceeds of his [criminal]
scheme.19
Thus, treating intent as an element of facilitation would per-
mit the clarification of many past decisions and provide a rational
principle to guide judges, prosecutors, and claimants. By providing
guidance, it might prevent innocent persons from being deprived
of property pending a forfeiture action that would not succeed
under present law. Judge Easterbrook wrote, "Bank accounts do
not commit crimes; people do. It makes no sense to confiscate
whatever balance happens to be in an account bearing a particular
number, just because proceeds of crime once passed through that
account.' ' 9 4 Looking to the possessor's intent would allow courts
to distinguish those cases in which money facilitated laundering
and those in which funds were "just passing through."
CONCLUSION
Limiting the scope of forfeiture to assets involved in transac-
tions in which the possessor intends to launder money would pro-
tect the innocent without unduly burdening prosecutors. Under the
intent-based standard, people would be protected from having
heavy costs imposed on the basis of only probable cause, and
wrongdoers would not be automatically deprived of the right to
191. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. United States, Nos. 93 Civ. 0307, 0357, 1993 WL
158542, at *7-*8 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1993), aff'd in part, remanded in part, 11 F.3d 1119
(2d Cir. 1993).
192. 847 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
193. Id. at 335.
194. United States v. $448,342.85, 969 F.2d 474, 476 (7th Cir. 1992).
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own property. Prosecutors still would have the weapons of burden-
shifting and the substitute assets provision to effect the will of
Congress and seize the fruits of crime. Moreover, this standard is
already implicit in many cases; it ought to be made explicit to
make the jurisprudence coherent and to protect the innocent.
